Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Human Condition' and 'Logic in Mathematics'

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49 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]