Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Sovereignty of Good' and 'Mere Possibilities'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch]
Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch]
It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch]
Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch]
Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch]