17 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |