108 ideas
| 12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
| 12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
| 12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
| 12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
| 10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
| 19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
| 12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
| 10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
| 10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
| 10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
| 10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
| 10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
| 10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
| 10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
| 10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
| 10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
| 10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
| 10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
| 10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
| 10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
| 10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
| 10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
| 10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
| 10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
| 18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
| 18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
| 12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
| 10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
| 10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
| 10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
| 10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
| 10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
| 10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
| 10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
| 10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
| 10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
| 10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
| 10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
| 10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
| 10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
| 10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
| 10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
| 10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
| 10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
| 8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
| 10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
| 10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
| 10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
| 10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
| 10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
| 10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
| 10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
| 10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
| 10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
| 10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
| 12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
| 12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
| 10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
| 10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
| 10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
| 10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
| 13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
| 10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
| 12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
| 12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
| 12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
| 12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
| 12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
| 12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
| 12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
| 10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
| 13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
| 12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
| 12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
| 10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
| 10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
| 12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
| 11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
| 12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
| 19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
| 5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
| 12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
| 5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
| 5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
| 10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
| 5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
| 12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
| 10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
| 10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
| 9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
| 10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |
| 12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
| 12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
| 12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
| 12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
| 5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
| 12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
| 12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
| 12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |