11 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |