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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysical Dependence' and 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]