20 ideas
18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
19419 | Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz] |
19421 | Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz] |
19420 | Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19416 | Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz] |
19422 | Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz] |
18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |
19418 | Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz] |
19417 | All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz] |