Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Dawn (Daybreak)' and 'Naming and Necessity lectures'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


140 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]