17 ideas
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
| 23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
| 23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
| 23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
| 23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
| 1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |