Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]