Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Kinds of Minds' and 'Understanding and Essence'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4608 Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4873 What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
4881 Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
4875 We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4879 There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4878 The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
4874 The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4882 Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4872 Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
4877 Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]