Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Varieties of Things' and '74: Reply to Colotes'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]