Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics' and 'Conditionals'

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29 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]