17 ideas
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
1748 | Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5989 | Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield] |