Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'How Things Might Have Been' and 'What Does It All Mean?'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
5988 Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
1496 The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
14874 Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
4001 The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
405 The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander]
13222 The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander]
404 Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander]
1495 Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
1746 The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius]