Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mind in a Physical World' and 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)'

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55 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander]
Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius]
Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander]
The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius]
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]