57 ideas
5988 | Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár] |
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
1496 | The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
14874 | Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
13222 | The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander] |
1495 | Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius] |
404 | Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander] |
405 | The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
1746 | The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius] |