Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Mind in Nature' and 'Theaetetus'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


69 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius]
The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander]
The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander]
Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]