Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'Monadology'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4642 No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
2115 Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
2111 Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
7644 The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
11857 He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
7843 Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
12751 It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
19363 Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
19352 A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
17554 There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2112 Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9344 Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2110 We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
19362 We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
12707 The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
2114 This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
2113 God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]