20 ideas
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |