Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Identity and Necessity' and 'The Varieties of Necessity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]