61 ideas
| 4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
| 22289 | Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| 10183 | An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price] |
| 22288 | We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| 10706 | Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| 9823 | Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind] |
| 10090 | Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman] |
| 17452 | Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck] |
| 7524 | Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk] |
| 14131 | Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| 14437 | Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| 18094 | Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
| 9824 | In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind] |
| 9826 | A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind] |
| 13508 | Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD] |
| 18096 | Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
| 18841 | Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind] |
| 14130 | Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| 8924 | Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride] |
| 9153 | Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K] |
| 4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
| 4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
| 4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
| 4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
| 4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
| 4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
| 4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
| 9825 | A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind] |
| 4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
| 4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
| 4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
| 4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
| 4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
| 4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
| 4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
| 4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
| 4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
| 4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
| 4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
| 4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
| 4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
| 4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
| 4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
| 4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
| 4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
| 4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
| 4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
| 4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
| 4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
| 4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
| 9189 | Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett] |
| 9827 | We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind] |
| 9979 | Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait] |
| 4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
| 4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
| 4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |