Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ordinatio' and 'Logicism Revisited'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]