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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Writings from Late Notebooks' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth'

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126 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche]
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche]
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach]
Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach]
The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach]
To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach]
Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach]
Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach]
We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach]
A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG]
The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach]
Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach]
The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach]
The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach]
In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche]
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche]
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach]
The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche]
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche]
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
With protoplasm ˝+˝=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche]
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche]
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche]
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche]
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche]
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche]
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche]
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche]