Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mathematics and the Metaphysicians' and 'Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
7557 To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
10059 In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
7556 A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
7554 Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]