36 ideas
| 19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
| 19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
| 19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
| 19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
| 19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
| 19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
| 19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
| 19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
| 19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
| 19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
| 19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
| 19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
| 19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
| 19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
| 19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
| 19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
| 12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
| 12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
| 12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
| 12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
| 19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
| 12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
| 12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
| 12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
| 12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
| 12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |