Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'Summula philosophiae naturalis'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham is the scholastic paradigm of anti-realism with respect to the categories.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 05.3
     A reaction: These are the ten categories mentioned in Aristotle's book 'Categories'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Ockham regards Quantity as an entirely superfluous ontological category, …because matter is intrinsically extended.
     From: report of William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 04.4
Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Matter is made to have a greater or lesser quantity not through its receiving any absolute accident, but through condensation and rarefaction alone. Parts come more or less close together, which can happen with local motion.
     From: William of Ockham (Summula philosophiae naturalis [1320], I.13), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.1
     A reaction: This is Ockham at his most modern, rejecting the odd idea of Quantity in favour of a modern corpuscular view of the mere motions of matter.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
     Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
     From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
     A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
     A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
     A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.