Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Husserl' and 'The Nature of Thought'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
     A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
     Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
     A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3)
     A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.