12887
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A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
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Full Idea:
A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
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From:
Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
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A reaction:
Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
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18925
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If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]
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Full Idea:
Williamson's view on modality is that everything that could exist does exist: since there could exist a talking donkey there actually exists some thing that could be a talking donkey.
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From:
report of Timothy Williamson (Modal Logic as Metaphysics [2013], n20) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmaking for Presentists n20
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A reaction:
Well that thing certainly isn't me, or Tim Williamson. I'm guessing that the thing is an actual donkey, probably a rather bright one. Actually, I think this is one of those views that invites the incredulous stare. (Barcan formulae).
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