12 ideas
| 1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular). | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2 | |
| A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle). |
| 1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else. | |
| From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
| 22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
| Full Idea: If justice is a virtue it must make action good by disposing its possessor to goodness in practical rationality; the latter consisting of the right recognition of reasons, and corresponding action. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.174) | |
| A reaction: This somewhat inverts Aristotle, who says the possessing of good practical reason is the key to acquiring the virtues. Foot suggests that possessing the virtue promotes the practical rationality. Someone can be sensible without being virtuous. |
| 22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
| Full Idea: No one thinks that calling a knife a good knife, a farmer a good farmer, a speech a good speech, a root a good root, necessarily expresses or even involves an attitude or feeling towards it. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.163) | |
| A reaction: This is the Aristotelian idea (which I favour) that good derives from function. In such a case it seems obvious that it has nothing to do with expressing emotions. |
| 22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The key notion is the concept of need, …as when we say what a plant or animal of a certain species needs to have, …and what its operative features, such roots, leaves, hearts and lungs, need to do. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.164) | |
| A reaction: Good. That takes it away from the idea of a function, which could be possessed by an inanimate machine (even though that still entails success and failure). Strictly, we need oxygen, but the goodness resides in the lungs. |
| 22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
| Full Idea: The teaching and observing of the rules of justice is as necessary a part of the life of human beings as hunting together in packs with a leader is a necessary part of the lives of wolves, or dancing part of the life of the dancing bee. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.168) | |
| A reaction: So why are some men unjust? All wolves hunt, and all appropriate bees dance. A few men even thrive on injustice. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |