7 ideas
| 19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability [Comesaņa] |
| Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough. | |
| From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: This is Comesaņa's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities. |
| 19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa] |
| Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem'). | |
| From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge. |
| 19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa] |
| Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified. | |
| From: Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'. |
| 7293 | It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says that it is legitimate to do harm if the harm is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a legitimate goal. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: I think a key principle of morality is our duty to think about possible unnoticed consequences of our actions. To neglect concern for side-effects is wicked. Beyond that, the issue must concern the particulars of the situation. |
| 7292 | War must also have a good chance of success, and be waged with moderation [Grayling] |
| Full Idea: To Aquinas's three conditions for war (Idea 7291) modern theorists have added two others: that to be just a war must have a reasonable chance of success, and that the means used to conduct it must be proportional to the ends sought. | |
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: These two principles strike me as being much more civilized and humane than Aquinas's original contribution, suggesting that in our theoretical thinking we might be making some progress. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |