40 ideas
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: Beyond the entities there are certain real 'modes', which are positive, and in their own right act on those entities, giving them something that is outside their whole essence as individuals existing in reality. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: Suárez is apparently the first person to formulate a proper account of properties as 'modes' of a thing, rather than as accidents which are separate, or are wholly integrated into a thing. A typical compromise proposal in philosophy. Can modes act? |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: The inherence of quantity is called its mode, because it affects that quantity, which serves to ultimately determine the state and character of its existence, but does not add to it any new proper entity, but only modifies the preexisting entity. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.1.17), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: He seems to present mode as a very active thing, like someone who gives it a coat of paint, or hammers it into a new shape. I don't see how a 'mode' can have any ontological status at all. To exist, there has to be some way to exist. |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: In the view of Suárez, substances are radically incomplete entities that cannot exist at all until determined in various ways by things of another kind, modes. …Modes are regarded as completers for their subjects. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.3 | |
| A reaction: This is correct. In order to be a piece of clay it needs a shape, a mass, a colour etc. Treating clay as an object independently from its shape is a misunderstanding. |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: A form is required that, as it were, rules over all those faculties and accidents, and is the source of all actions and natural motions of such a being, and in which the whole variety of accidents and powers has its root and unity. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
| A reaction: Pasnau emphasises that this is scholastics giving a very physical and causal emphasis to forms, which made them vulnerable to doubts among the new experiment physicists. Pasnau says forms are 'metaphysical', following Leibniz. |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: In a tree the part of the form that is in the leaf is not the same character as the part that is in the fruit., but yet they are partial forms, and apt to be united ….to compose one complete form of the whole. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.30), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.6 | |
| A reaction: This is a common scholastic view, the main opponent of which was Aquinas, who says each thing only has one form. Do leaves have different DNA from the bark or the fruit? Presumably not (since I only have one DNA), which supports Aquinas. |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: The most powerful arguments establishing substantial forms are based on the necessity, for the perfect constitution of a natural being, that all the faculties and operations of that being are rooted in one essential principle. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 15.10.64), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.4 | |
| A reaction: Note Idea 15756, that this stability not only applies to biological entities (the usual Aristotelian examples), but also to non-living natural kinds. We might say that the drive for survival is someone united around a single entity. |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: We can say that the form that gives corporeal bulk [molem] or extension to things is the essential nature of quantity. To have bulk is to expel a similar bulk from the same space. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 539 | |
| A reaction: This is one step away from asking why, once we knew the bulk and extension of the thing, we would still have any interest in trying to grasp something called its 'quantity'. |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: We can almost never set out the essences of things, as they are in things. Instead, we work through their connection to some non-essential feature, and we seem to succeed well enough when we spell it out through the feature closest to the essence. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5 | |
| A reaction: It is a common view that with geometrical figures we can actually experience the essence itself. So has science broken through, and discerned actual essences of things? |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: To be really the same excludes being really other, but does not exclude being other modally or mentally. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 7.65) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: So the statue and the clay are identical, but they could become separate, or be imagined as separate. |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Real Essential distinction says if A and B are not of the same natural kind, then they are essentially distinct. This is the highest degree of distinction. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Boulter says Peter is essentially distinct from a cabbage, because neither has the nature of the other. |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Minor Real distinction is if A can exist without B, but B ceases to exist without A. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: This is one-way independence. Boulter's example is Peter and Peter's actual weight. |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Major Real distinction is if A can exist in the real order without B, and B can exist in the real order without A. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Boulter's example is the distinction between Peter and Paul, where their identity of kind is irrelevant. This is two-way independence. |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Conceptual or Mental distinction is when A and B are actually identical but we have two different ways of conceiving them. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: This is the Morning and Evening Star. I bet Frege never read Suarez. This seems to be Spinoza's concept of mind/body. |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The Modal distinction is when A is not B or a property of B, but still could not possibly exist without B. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: Duns Scotus proposed in, Ockham rejected it, but Suarez supports it. Suarez proposes that light's dependence on the Sun is distinct from the light itself, in this 'modal' way. |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: The scholastic view is that Actuality is our only guide to possibility in the real order. One knows that it is possible to separate A and B if one knows that A and B have actually been separated or are separate. | |
| From: report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4 | |
| A reaction: It may be possible to separate A and B even though it has never happened, but it is hard to see how we could know that. (But if I put my pen down where it has never been before, I know I can pick it up again, even though this has not previously happened). |
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The most familiar epistemological theories are foundation theories, coherence theories, probabilistic theories, and reliabilist theories. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], Pref) | |
| A reaction: A helpful list. Reliabilism is now the dominant externalist theory. Probability theories will centre on Bayes' Theorem (Idea 2798). The authors want an internalist theory that includes perceptions as well as beliefs. I currently favour coherence. |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore). |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If we want an agent to believe as many truths as possible, this could be achieved by simply believing everything; if we want an agent to have only true beliefs, this could be achieved by believing nothing. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §6.6) | |
| A reaction: I like this. It highlights the pragmatic need for a middle road, in which a core set of beliefs are going to be approved of as 'knowledge', so that we can get on with life. This has to be a social matter, and needs flexibility of Fallibilism. |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We defend a version of direct realism, saying that justification must be partly a function of perceptual states themselves, and not just a function of our beliefs about perceptual states. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Judgement suggests that perceptual states give good justification about primary qualities (like mass or shape), but not of secondary qualities (like smell or colour). Perceptions can be downright misleading. |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Phenomenalism offered the prospect of explaining perceptual knowledge within a framework that recognised only conclusive reasons; once it is acknowledged that at least induction uses nonconclusive reasons, it is no longer needed. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that that is the only motivation for phenomenalism, which seemed to be attempting to get as close to 'reality' as intellectual honesty would allow. I certainly favour the modern relaxed attitude to knowledge, which needn't be 'conclusive'. |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Perception is a causal process that inputs beliefs into our doxastic system without their being inferred from or justified on the basis of other beliefs we already have. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This topic is much discussed (e.g. by MacDowell). I don't see how something is going to qualify as a 'belief' if it doesn't involve concepts and propositions. The point that we are caused to have many of our beliefs (rather than judging) seems right. |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We think it is a mistake to suppose that the evidence of our senses comes to us in the form of beliefs; in perception, the beliefs we form are almost invariably about the objective properties of physical objects - not about how they appear to us. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The tricky word here is 'evidence'. At what point in the process of perception does something begin to count as evidence? It must at least involve concepts (and maybe even propositions) if it is going to be thought about in that way. |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Bayesian epistemology is based upon the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is sufficiently probable) and Bayes' Theorem. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1) | |
| A reaction: For Bayes' Theorem, see Idea 2798. There is the question of whether the proposition is subjectively or objectively probable (I believe in ghosts, so any shadow is probably a ghost). There is also the problem of objective evidence for the calculation. |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Internalist theories make justifiability of a belief a function of the internal states of the believer, in the sense that if we vary anything but his internal states the justifiability of the belief does not vary. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §5.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a nice clear definition of internalism (and, by implication, externalism). It favours externalism. I know my car is in the car park; someone takes it for a joyride, then replaces it; my good justification seems thereby weakened. |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses. |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: What foundationalism requires is self-justification, which is weaker than incorrigibility. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.3) | |
| A reaction: The writers oppose foundationalism, but this remark obviously helps the theory. Bonjour votes for a fallible rationalist foundationalism, and an fallible empiricist version seems plausible (because we must check for hallucinations etc.). |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning, it seems, can only justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds slick and conclusive, but it isn't. If we accept that some truths might be 'self-evident' to reason, they could stand independently. And a large body of rational beliefs might be mutually self-supporting, as in the coherence theory of truth. |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Either no belief is prima facie justified or all beliefs are prima facie justified; …we regard this as a decisive refutation of foundationalism. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The full text must he examined, but it is not at all clear to me how my belief that quantum theory is correct could be even remotely as prima facie justified as my belief that this is my hand. I don't think basic beliefs need be sharply divided off. |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The regress argument has no apparent strength against negative coherence theories, because they do not require reasons for beliefs. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Such theories endorse Neurath's picture (Idea 6348). On the whole philosophers like positive support for their beliefs, so the rather passive picture of accepting everything unless it is undermined is not appealing. A fall-back position. |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary. |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The Isolation Argument objects that coherence theories cut justification off from the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't see this as a strong objection. Justification can be in the way beliefs cohere together, but the beliefs themselves consist of holding propositions to be true, and truth asserts a connection to the world (I say). |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right). | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts. |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory. |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We cannot forsake all of our beliefs and start over again, because then we could not know how to start. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: A point with which it is hard to disagree, but even Descartes agreed with it (Idea 3604). Presumably all your beliefs can take it in turn to be doubted, while others are held true, or you can whittle the beliefs which can't be abandoned down to a minimum. |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Enumerative induction examines a sample of objects, observes they all have a property, and infers that they all have that property; statistical induction observes a proportion of the objects having the property, and infers that proportion in general. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.4.6) | |
| A reaction: There is also induction by elimination, where it is either p or q, and observation keeps saying it isn't p. A small sample is very unreliable, but a huge sample (e.g. cigarettes and cancer) is almost certain, so where is the small/huge boundary? |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: It follows from the probability calculus that every tautology has probability 1; it then follows in Bayesian epistemology that we are justified in believing every tautology. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1.5) | |
| A reaction: If I say 'a bachelor is a small ant' you wouldn't believe it, but if I said 'I define a bachelor as a small ant' you would have to believe it. 'Bachelors are unmarried' men is a description of English usage, so is not really a simple tautology. |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The confirmation of scientific theories is probably best viewed in terms of inference to the best explanation. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.3) | |
| A reaction: A simple claim, but one with which I strongly agree. 'Inference', of course, implies that there is some fairly strict logical thinking going on, which may not be so. I suspect that dogs can move to the best explanation. It is, though, a rational process. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |
| Full Idea: An angelic substance could be penetrated by other bodies in the same location. | |
| From: Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.2.21), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.3 | |
| A reaction: So am I co-located with an angel right now? |