Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief' and 'Philosophical Remarks'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says you should rationally conclude that your ticket will not win the lottery, and then apply the same reasoning to all the other tickets, and conclude that no ticket will win the lottery.
     From: report of Henry E. Kyburg Jr (Probability and Logic of Rational Belief [1961]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §7.2.8
     A reaction: (Very compressed by me). I doubt whether this is a very deep paradox; the conclusion that I will not win is a rational assessment of likelihood, but it is not the result of strict logic.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: What I once called 'objects', simples, were simply what I could refer to without running the risk of their possible non-existence.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.72), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 52 'Simp'
     A reaction: For most of us, you can refer to something because you take it to be an object. For these Fregean influenced guys (e.g. Hale) something is an object because you can refer to it. Why don't they use 'object*' for their things?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The essence of language is a picture of the essence of the world.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.85), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 17
     A reaction: Hence for a long time the study of language seemed to be the way to do metaphysics. Now they study mathematical logic, with the same hope.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: It isn't possible to believe something for which you cannot imagine some kind of verification.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Remarks [1930], p.200), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr'
     A reaction: In 1930 LW was calling this his 'old principle'. As it stands here it is too vague to assert very much.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.