81 ideas
| 20262 | Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One ought not to use one's wisdom to become clever! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 308) | |
| A reaction: And I would add 'don't think that being clever makes you wise'. Nietzsche, as always, is subtler than me (which is why I read him a lot). Presumably wisdom is broad, and cleverness is focused. Will becoming clever spoil someone's wisdom? |
| 20255 | Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Early 19th century German philosophers retreated to the first and oldest level of speculation, for, like the thinkers of dreamy ages, they found satisfaction in concepts rather than in explanations - they resuscitated a prescientific type of philosophy. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 197) | |
| A reaction: I have a suspicion that this may still apply to 'continental philosophy'. Personally I love explanations, which lead to understanding. But not all explanations are scientific. |
| 20260 | Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Thomas Carlyle spent a long life trying to make reason romantic to his fellow Englishmen: to no avail! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 298) | |
| A reaction: An interesting gloss on the shift from the Enlightenment to the Romantic era. Presumably the idea of the 'genius' and the 'hero' are the means whereby Carlyle hoped to achive this. |
| 20256 | What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We have at every moment only that very thought for which we have ready to hand the words that are roughly capable of expressing it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 257) | |
| A reaction: This is a highly influential idea, even if this expression of it is little known. Everyone who places language at the centre of philosophy believes something like this. It is a very striking thought, and must certainly contain considerable truth. |
| 20265 | The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is playacting going on among systematisers: inasmuch as they want to make the system whole and round off the horizon around it, they must attempt to have their weaker qualities appear in the same style as their strong ones. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 318) | |
| A reaction: Filed under 'rationalism', because they are the notorious system builders, but the same tendency and problem can be seen to some extent among empiricsts who seek completeness. David Lewis, perhaps. |
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: My plea, whatever conclusions are drawn, is to control the metaphysical discussion by continual reference to suggested truthmakers. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.7) | |
| A reaction: ...And my plea is to control metaethical discussion by continual reference to value-makers. In general, this is the approach which will deliver a unified account of the world. Truthmakers are the ideal restraint on extravagant metaphysics. |
| 20380 | Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I have no idea why the dictatorship and omnipotence of truth would be desirable; it's sufficient for me that it has great power. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], §507) | |
| A reaction: I once heard a philosopher (at Essex University) assert that truth is the only value, which was interesting. Nietzsche actually wants to endorse the value of lies and deceptions, like the 'noble lie' in Plato's Republic. |
| 20235 | Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Even that nose for truth, which is, at bottom, the nose for safety, human beings have in common with animals. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 026) | |
| A reaction: After Darwin, Nietzsche immediately saw that we need an account of humanity which is continuous with animals. The first step to physical security is ascertaining the physical facts. This idea rings true. |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Truth-making cannot be any form of entailment. Both terms of an entailment relation must be propositions, but the truth-making term of the truth-making relation is a portion of reality, and, in general at least, portions of reality are not propositions. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: Along with Idea 18466, that seems to firmly demolish the idea that truth-making is a logical entailment. |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| Full Idea: In a bold manouevre Armstrong posited a metaphysically primitive relation of necessitation, and then defined truth-makers in terms of this bridging relation, as a thing that necessitates something being true. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3) by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.2 | |
| A reaction: [Not sure of page reference] Spelled out so clearly by MacBride, this sounds dubious. How many truths are necessitated by the City of London? Do truthmakers necessitate the existence of their truths? MacBride says it's a circular theory. |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Postulate a higher-order state of affairs, of all the states of affairs in which Theaetetus is involved. Is this not a good candidate for a truthmaker for the negative truth that 'Theaetetus is not flying'? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2) | |
| A reaction: It certainly seems extravagant to need the whole universe to make true 'there are no lions in this room'. But for 'there are no unicorns' it is not clear which states of affairs unicorns are involved. (Armstrong is aware of this). |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Each of the arctic animals is by its nature different from a penguin, so this general state of affairs seems truthmaker enough for this negative existential. Similarly, the totality of all birds eliminates the phoenix. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Why is it 'animals' in one case, and 'birds' in the other? What if there was no life in arctic? Would the snow then do the job? This doesn't seem to work. |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A mathematical entity exists if and only if it is possible that there be instantiations of that structure. This transforms the question of truthmakers for the existence of mathematical entities into a question of truthmakers for certain possibilities. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.3) | |
| A reaction: This modal approach to structuralism [for which he endorses Hellman 1989] opens up a modal approach to other truthmakers, which places dispositions at the centre of physical truthmaking. No sets of Meinongian objects? |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It seems reasonable to say that a truthmaker for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the truth that the contradictory of that truth is possible. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.2) | |
| A reaction: The truthmaker will have to be not only some fact, but also the additional fact that it is contingent, in order to generate the possibility of the contradictory. |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The obvious minimal truthmaker for the truth that 'it is possible that a unicorn exists' is combinatorial. The elements of the combination are all that is needed. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that there are no possibilities which are not combinations of what currently exists. |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that there could have been nothing. ...What would be its truthmaker? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.4) | |
| A reaction: I suppose the truthmaker here is the whole of reality, with its dispositions and contingencies. But that won't do for 'possibly there might never have been anything'. In such a case there wouldn't be any truths. |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
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Full Idea:
The mereological sum of what happens to be all the men does not necessitate that it is all the men. So if truthmaking involves necessitation, then this object cannot be the complete truthmaker for |
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| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 06.1) | |
| A reaction: [He invokes Russell has his source] His point is that the truthmaker needs a further fact, beyond the men, which specifies that this is all of them. But only if truthmakers necessitate their truths (as Armstrong claims). I'm sympathetic to both claims. |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The idea is that braces { } attribute to an entity the place-holding, or perhaps determinable, property of unithood. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.5) | |
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A reaction:
I like this. There is Socrates himself, then there is my concept |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
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Full Idea:
The null class is useful in formal set theory, but I hope that does not require that there be a thing called the null class which is truthmaker for the strange proposition |
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| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
| A reaction: It is not quite clear why it doesn't, but then it is not quite clear to philosophers what the status of the null set is, in comparison with sets that have members. |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Classes, because they have a particular cardinality, are essentially a certain number of ones, things that, within the particular class, are each taken as a unit. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
| A reaction: [Singletons are exceptions] So units are basic to set theory, which is the foundations of technical analytic philosophy (as well as, for many, of mathematics). If you can't treat something as a unit, it won't go into set theory. Vagueness... |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3) | |
| A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative... |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I define 'naturalism' as the hypothesis that the world of space-time is all that there is. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 09.1) | |
| A reaction: This is helpful, because it doesn't mention the nature of the physical matter contained in space-time, leaving theories like panpsychism as possible naturalistic theories. Galen Strawson, for example. |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There must exist states of affairs as truthmakers, to get us beyond 'loose and separate' entities. ...They can be bundles of tropes, or trope-with-particular, or bundles of universals ('compresence'), or instantiations. They are an addition to ontology. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.5) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong is the great champion of states of affairs. They seem rather vague to me, and disconcertingly timeless. |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The 'thing itself' seems not be a minimal truthmaker for the thing having its particular mass. ...The thing has a great many other properties. ...It seems entirely reasonable to postulate that the object has properties that are objectively there. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
| A reaction: This is Armstrong using the truthmaker principle to argue for the existence of properties (as instantiated universals). I like truthmakers, but truths do not have enough precision in their parts for us to read off reality from them. |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A set of determinates under the one determinable are incompatible by definition. If an object is not one mile in length, then its actual length will be incompatible with being one mile in length. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a much better general version of the standard example 'if it is red it can't be green'. Armstrong uses it to give a more precise account of incompatibility. Useful. |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Length is a 'determinable' property; being some particular length, such as a mile, is one of its 'determinates'. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.1) | |
| A reaction: The seem to be 'type' and 'token' properties, except that this other vocabulary indicates the link between them. |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: 'Non-transferable' theories of tropes hold that the mass is of this stone by necessity. It is an identity condition for the property. Every property then becomes an essential property. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Martin and Heil for this view] It is hard to see in this proposal how the trope is in any way separate from its substance, and hence it seems a bit of a vacuous theory. (The other theories of properties aren't much cop either). |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Properties are not powers. But properties have powers. They bestow powers. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. In this view, powers become extremely vague things, ranging from the fine-grained to the hugely broad. It seems to me that powers are precise and real, but properties are the vague unhelpful things. |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Powers must surely issue in manifestations that are something more than just powers. A world where potency never issued in act, but only in more potency, would be one where one travelled without ever having the possibility of arriving. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: Tricky. The picture I favour is that the distinction between powers and categorical properties is a misunderstanding. What is fundamental is active and powerful categoricals. |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: If masses are powers, the forces generated between two particulars have to vary inversely with the square of their distance apart. Have not the masses got to 'know' at what distance they are from each other, to exert the right amount of force? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a good warning against a simplistic account of powers doing all the work, but I suspect that more sophisticated physics would offer the fan of powers a solution here. The power is to 'spread' the force around. |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: For a Class Nominalist 'the class of all 4-kilo objects' is the truthmaker for the truth that the particular has just that mass. Yet this looks far too big! Would not the object still be four kilos even if the other members of the class had never existed? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 04.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems so obvious to me as to be hardly worth saying. To identify redness with the class of red entities just seems crazy. Why do they belong in that class? Armstrong is illustrating the value of the truthmaker idea in philosophy. |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There is 'partial identity' where one entity contains another with something to spare, or else where entities overlap each other. ...Extensive quantities, such as length and mass, are the particularly plausible cases. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.5) | |
| A reaction: This looks like a very useful concept which deserves wider use. It will help discussions of rivers, statues, intersecting roads etc. |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It seems natural and plausible to say that it is the fact that a necessary truth is itself necessary that determines its truth in all possible worlds. This intension determines its extension across possible worlds. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 08.1) | |
| A reaction: Well said. To me (but not to Armstrong) this implies essentialism, that the necessity arises from the intrinsic natures of the things involved. The whole Lewisian approach of explaining things by mapping them strikes me as wrong. |
| 20258 | Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Most people take a thing they know under their protection, as if knowing it turned it into their possession. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 285) | |
| A reaction: A typically wicked and subtle remark. This presumably makes knowledge part of the will to power, with which Francis Bacon would presumably agree. |
| 20250 | We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It has yet to be proven that there is such a thing as forgetting; all we know is that the act of remembering is not within our power. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 126) | |
| A reaction: There is some evidence for this. We forget innumerable people, but then find that we recognise them if we meet them many years later. Anecdotes report very ancient memories suddenly surfacing. |
| 20270 | There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is no one and only scientific method that leads to knowledge. We must proceed experimentally with things, be sometimes angry, sometimes affectionate towards them, and allow justice, passion, and coldness to follow one upon another. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 432) | |
| A reaction: Alexander Bird says the same thing in our time. I agree, but I think there is a core of controlled conditions and peer review. |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: General truths are a species of negative truth, 'no more' truths, asserting that there are no more men than the mortal ones, no more ravens than the black ones. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.1) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to distinguish between 'absences' and 'limits' in this area. |
| 20131 | We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis; one can do it with the good or bad taste of a gardener. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 560) | |
| A reaction: This sort of existentialism I find very appealing. You take what you are given, the cards you are dealt, and try to make something nice out of it. This is quite different from the crazy freedom of later existentialists. |
| 20242 | Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Only when the human being has finally attained knowledge of all things will he have known himself. For things are merely the boundaries of the human being. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 048) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a rather externalist view of the mind. If philosophy aims to disentangle mind from world then good knowledge of the world seems to be required. |
| 20249 | Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: No matter how hard a person struggles for self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete than the image of all the drives taken together than constitute his being. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 119) | |
| A reaction: This gives the concept of personal identity that arises from the (later) doctrine of the 'will to power'. It is a bundle view of the self, but a bundle of drives rather than of percepts and mental events. His view is close to Hume's. |
| 20231 | People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: People used to believe that the outcome of an action was not a consequence, but an independent, supplemental ingredient, namely God's. Is a greater confusion conceivable? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 012) | |
| A reaction: Not sure how well documented or accurate this is, but Nietzsche was a great scholar, and it would explain the fatalism that runs through many older forms of society. |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The thesis of 'expressibility' says that for all being, there is a proposition (perhaps one never formulated by any mind at any time) that truly renders the existence and nature of this being. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.3.2) | |
| A reaction: [He credits Stephen Read 2000:68-9 for this] Armstrong accepts this, but I deny it. I can't make any sense of this vast plethora of propositions, each exactly expressing some minute nuance of the infinity complexity of all being. |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: We could not stand in any causal or nomic relation to a realm of propositions over and above the space-time world, ...so it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 02.6) | |
| A reaction: I agree, and I like Armstrong's appeal to explanation as a criterion for whether we should make an ontological commitment here. I am baffled by anyone who thinks reality is crammed full of unarticulated propositions. Only a philosopher.... |
| 20266 | It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It is not yet enough to prove a thing, one must seduce people to accept it or raise them up to it. That is why a knowledgeable person ought to learn to speak his wisdom: and often in such a way that it sounds like foolishness. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 330) | |
| A reaction: Kant comes to mind. He has needed endless exegesis by people who write better than him. Have there been even greater philosophers who couldn't express their wisdom at all? Cratylus, perhaps! |
| 20251 | Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Of all actions, the ones least understood are those undertaken for a purpose, no doubt because they have always passed for the most intelligible and are to our way of thinking the most commonplace. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 127) | |
| A reaction: You feel that Nietzsche is right about our stupendous lack of of self-knowledge, but then a bit of a panic ensues, because it is not clear what you are supposed to do about anything, particularly if we don't know why anyone else does anything. |
| 20271 | Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: By beauty in art one always understands imitation of happiness. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 433) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure how one goes about imitating happiness. One can replicate things that make us happy, like a nice landscape. But some beauty in art is also novel, and produces a new sort of happiness. Kandinsky. |
| 20230 | The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Even to think of criticising morality, to consider morality as a problem, as problematic: what? was that not - is that not - immoral? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], Pref 3) | |
| A reaction: Offering critiques of the value of morality and of truth are perhaps Nietzsche's greatest achievements. |
| 20234 | Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Morality acts to prevent the rise of new and better mores: it stupefies. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 019) | |
| A reaction: Note that he wants 'better' customs, and not just different ones. So the deep question concerns the criteria for why some customs are better. He seems to want us to fulfil our natures more completely. Arts, sciences, great deeds... |
| 20237 | Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The history of moral feeling is completely different from the history of moral concepts. The former are powerful before, the latter especially after an action in view of the compulsion to pronounce upon it. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 034) | |
| A reaction: I think he places the feelings in our animal origins, and the concepts in rather unnatural cultures. |
| 20238 | Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To trust your feelings - that means obeying your grandfather and your grandmother and their grandparents more than the gods in us: our reason and our experience. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 035) | |
| A reaction: He says prior to this that feelings are just an inheritance, not our true natures. Stoics said 'live according to nature', by which they meant 'live by reason', because that is our true nature. |
| 20243 | Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Formerly one tried to get a feel for the majesty of human beings by pointing backward toward their divine descent: this has now become a forbidden path. ...So now the path humanity pursues is proof of its majesty. Alas, this too leads nowhere! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 049) | |
| A reaction: I love the breadth of Nietzsche's vision, both across history, and in the great scheme. He goes on to say that we are no more a 'higher order' than ants and earwigs. |
| 20268 | Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The act of dying is not as significant as the universal awe of it would have us believe, and the dying person has probably lost more important things in life than he is now about to lose. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 349) | |
| A reaction: He says this is a thought about death which we tend to repress. It would depend on the life, I should think, but it is probably right in very many cases. |
| 20252 | Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Lovers' vows ought to be publicly declared invalid and marriage denied the pair: and indeed precisely because one ought to take marriage unspeakably more seriously! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 151) | |
| A reaction: Sounds like the traditional aristocratic attitude to marriage, so the idea suits Nietzsche. I think that nowadays it is much wiser to be base proposal of marriage on friendship than on love. You are choosing a life-long friend, not someone to adore. |
| 20236 | Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The institution of marriage stubbornly upholds the belief that love, though a passion, is, as such, capable of duration. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 027) | |
| A reaction: No wonder Nietzsche never married. Women must have been terrified of him, when he came out with this sort of remark. I doubt whether many couples who are celebrating their golden wedding would agree with him. [1/5/2017] |
| 20263 | Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Fear has furthered the universal knowledge of humanity more than love, for fear wants to discern who the other person is, what he can do and what he wants. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 309) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche had it in for love at this stage in his career. This remark strikes me as brilliantly accurate. |
| 20233 | Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: With this infamous art of interpreting the concept of punishment, people have robbed of its innocence the whole, pure contingency of events. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 013) | |
| A reaction: What a wonderfully subtle observation about moral luck! That whole problem is driven by the issue of whether the agent should be punished. When a chain of errors leads to disaster, we may see many innocent people doing a collective evil. |
| 20248 | People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Whatever they say about their 'egotism', people nevertheless do nothing their whole life long for their ego, but instead for the phantom ego that has formed in the heads around them and been communicated to them. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 105) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche has a vision of true devotion to the ego as healthy, and so (I would say) does Aristotle, though the two might disagree about the details. I want to live among people who work on themselves, not those who always sacrifice themselves. |
| 20246 | If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Supposing we felt toward someone else as that person feels about himself, then we would have to hate him if he (like Pascal) found himself hateful. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 063) | |
| A reaction: And how does the Golden Rule work if the other people feel suicidal (as groups sometimes do)? |
| 20272 | Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Among neither the Socratic nor the Christian virtues does honesty appear: it is one of the youngest virtues, still quite immature. ...We can advance it or retard it, as we see fit. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 456) | |
| A reaction: I associate the virtue of honesty with the cult of sincerity of feelings which arose in the romantic movement. |
| 20240 | The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The Jews felt differently about wrath than we do and decreed it holy; in return, they, as a people, viewed the foreboding majesty of the individual with whom wrath showed itself connected, at a height at which a European is incapable of imagining. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 038) | |
| A reaction: If you thought wrath was really wonderful then presumably you would aspire to partake of it, but I see no signs of the Jews having been an especially wrathful people. It sounds like the tantrums of Tudor monarchs, which was their royal privilege. |
| 20244 | Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Christianity disallows all moral value to the virtue of philosophers - the triumph of reason over affects - and demands that affects reveal themselves in splendour, as love of God, fear before God, fanatical faith in God, and blindest hope in God. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 058) | |
| A reaction: Faith, hope and charity are the three great Christian virtues that were added to the four cardinal virtues of the Greeks. |
| 20274 | The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Honest towards ourselves and whatever else is our friend; courageous toward the enemy; magnanimous toward the defeated; polite - always. This is how the four cardinal virtues want us to be. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 556) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be Nietzsche genuinely asserting his four cardinal virtues, rather than being ironic. He certainly asserts politeness as the fourth virtue earlier in the book. Cf a different list in Idea 20382 |
| 20257 | Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Courage as cold bravery and imperturbability, and courage as feverish, half-blind bravura - one calls both of these things by the same name! How different are the cold virtues from the warm ones! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 277) | |
| A reaction: How few philosophers are capable of making a subtle but accurate observation like this! How many other virtues should be subdivided? |
| 20259 | Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The surest way to ruin a youth is by teaching him to respect those who think like him more highly than those who think differently. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 297) | |
| A reaction: On the whole I prefer to read the philosophers who seem to be on my side, because I am trying to strengthen my explanation of the world, and opponents aren't much help. I do read opponents, if they explicitly challenge what I defend. |
| 20267 | Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To require that duty always be somewhat burdensome - as Kant does - amounts to acquiring that it never become habit and custom: in this requirement there linger a tiny remnant of ascetic cruelty. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 339) | |
| A reaction: Habit, of course, is the ideal of Aristotelian virtue. |
| 20275 | Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We are free to handle and cultivate our drives like a gardener ...but how many people know we are free to do this? Don't most people believe in themselves as completed, full grown up facts? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 560) | |
| A reaction: I see Nietzsche as an existentialist philosopher. He is much more than that, but this quotation endorses what I take to be the central idea of existentialism. |
| 20229 | No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: As long as the world has existed, no authority has ever willingly permitted itself to become the object of critique. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], Pref 3) | |
| A reaction: A political remark, but it leads into speaking of conventional morality as just such an authority. Nowadays teachers have feedback forms, and leaders have to endure party conferences. But on the whole it remains true. |
| 20254 | People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Some govern out of pleasure in governing, others in order not to be governed - to the latter, governing is merely the lesser of two evils. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 181) | |
| A reaction: Our current society is full of self-employed people whose major motivation is to avoid being employees. |
| 20273 | The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The 'Great Revolution' [in France] was nothing more than a pathetic and bloody quackery, which understood how, through sudden crises, to supply a trusting Europe with the sudden hope of recovery. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 534) | |
| A reaction: Whenever a new leader comes into power there is the same honeymoon period, where dreams of salvation have a moment in the sun. |
| 20232 | Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: People of diligence and goodwill, lend a hand in the one work of eradicating from the face of the earth the concept of punishment, which has overrun the whole world! There is no more noxious weed! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 013) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche never tried his hand at school teaching or parenting or running a youth club. But I still love this idea. In really good families I suspect that punishment is almost unknown. |
| 20253 | Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The great wars of our day are the effects of the study of history. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 180) | |
| A reaction: The Prussians reacted to Napoleon. The Nazis reacted to Versailles. But now the study of history reveals to us dreadful wars based on simplistic accounts of history. Be wise about history, not ignorant of it. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20261 | History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The writer of history deals not with what really happened but merely with supposed events, for only the latter have had an effect. ...All historians speak of things that have never existed except in imagination. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 307) | |
| A reaction: This seems blatantly true, and is most obvious in the case of forged documents which have been hugely influential. Erroneous conspiracy theories are another example. (Note: only scorn conspiracy theories if you think conspiracies never happen!). |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Is it not very plausible that negative causations supervene on the positive causations together with the laws that govern the positive causations? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 05.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This obviously has a naturalistic appeal, since all causation can then be based on the actual world. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The metaphysical present will be a strict instant, or, if time is not infinitely divisible, the present will be a minimum granule of duration. But strict instants or minimal granules of duration, if these exist, cannot be experienced. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 11) | |
| A reaction: He points out that this is ironic, since Presentism lies on the basic experience of the present. |
| 20241 | Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Investigators of knowledge ...have regularly presupposed that the salvation of humanity depended on insight into the origin of things. ...but with insight into origin comes the increasing insignificance of origin. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 044) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like the etymological fallacy, of thinking that the origin of a word gives you a true grasp of its meaning. |
| 20245 | Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: You can say what you like: Christianity wanted to liberate humanity from the burden of the demands of morality by pointing out a shorter way to perfection, or so it believed. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 059) | |
| A reaction: This conjures up Graham Greene's Catholic heroes, who wallow in sin, but hope for salvation at the last moment. |
| 20247 | Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Not what is Christian in it, rather the universal heathenism of its rituals is the reason for the propagation of this world religion. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 070) | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid I think this is right. I grew up bewildered by the lack of content in the rituals of church services. Even austere protestants manage to sing and recite. Maybe philosophies should do this - wanted: new Cartesian and Kantian rituals! |
| 20269 | 'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Many people have achieved the humility that says: 'I believe because it is absurd', and have sacrificed their reason for it. But no one, as far as I know, has achieved the humility, which is only one step further, of 'I believe because I am absurd'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 417) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche gives the Latin: 'credo quia absurdum est' (Tertullian), and 'credo quia absurdus sum'. It may look like an insulting remark from Nietzsche, but it is actually in tune with the spirit of the original. |
| 20264 | The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The sum of inner movements that are easy for a person and that he consequently performs happily and with grace is called his 'soul'; - if inner movements obviously cause him difficulty and effort, he is considered soulless. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 311) | |
| A reaction: 'Soulless' is usually applied to people deficient in some sort of empathic feeling, or with an inability to recognise grandeur. It seems to imply that people who experience inner torture are soulless, but romantics see them as very soulful. |