7 ideas
| 19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the sciences and of the art of applying them. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 0) | |
| A reaction: 'Sciences' should be understood fairly broadly here (e.g. of architecture, agriculture, grammar). This is a scholar's vision of wisdom, very different from the notion of the wisest person in a village full of illiterate people. |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If a proposition is 'made' true, it has to be true 'in virtue of' something, meaning a relationship of metaphysical explanation. Thus a true proposition must have truth conferred on it in some way that explains how it gets to be true. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.202) | |
| A reaction: It is good to ask what we mean by 'makes'. I like essentialist explanations, but this may be misplaced. Observing that y makes x true seems to be rather less than actually explaining how it does it. What would such explanations look like? |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Modes are real beings that stand in non-contingent formal ontological relations both to individual substances and to immanent universals. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.212) | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I pass it on. 'Modes' seem to invite the Razor, if we already have substances and universals. I am no clear about 'instantiation' because I now have the word 'mode' to play with. |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Pure trope theorists must apparently hold that each trope has its identity underivatively, not that it depends for it on or owes it to other entities of any sort. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (An essentialist approach to Truth-making [2009], p.207) | |
| A reaction: Lowe defends dependent 'modes' of things, against independent 'tropes'. Good, but he then has to say what the thing is (a modeless 'substance'?), because it can't just be a bundle of modes or tropes. |
| 19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 1) | |
| A reaction: I would track both of these back to the concept of perfect understanding, which is admittedly a bit vague. Does a finite mind need to predict every speck of dust to have perfect knowledge? Do we have perfect knowledge of triangles? |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |