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All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Events as property exemplifications' and 'Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags)'

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53 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: To show reverence for a wise man is itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man].
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: It is characteristic of Epicurus to move up a level in his thinking, and not merely respect wisdom, but ask after the value of his own respect. Compare Idea 14517. Nice.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: In philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 27)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71
     A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
     Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections'
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
     Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
     A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
     A reaction: I don't actually buy the idea that an event could just be an 'exemplification'. Change seems to be required, and processes, or something like them, must be mentioned. Degrees of fine-graining sound good, though, for processes too.
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: If Kim's events are just the ordered triple of is that such things are standardly conceived as abstract entities, usually sets, whereas events are concretely located in space and time.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: You might reply that the object, and maybe the attribute, are concrete, and the time is natural, but the combination really is an abstraction, even though it is located (like the equator). Where is the set of my books located?
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
     Full Idea: Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of , since many such triples do not yield events, such as . Kim has to specify that the object actually has that property at that time.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property?
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
     Full Idea: Kim's events are exemplifications by an object of an attribute at a time...It does not make events basic entities, as the three constituents are more basic, but it gives identity conditions (two events are the same if object, attribute and time the same).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: [Aristotle is said to be behind this] I am more sympathetic to this view than the claim that events are primitive. If a pebble is ellipsoid for a million years, is that an event? I think the concept of a 'process' is the most fruitful one to investigate.
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: Since some tautologously universal properties such as self-identity or being such that 2+2=4 apply to all things at all times, that is stretching Kim's events too far. Candidate properties need to be realistically restricted, and it is unclear how.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
     A reaction: You could deploy Schoemaker's concept of natural properties in terms of the source of causal powers, but the problem would be that you were probably hoping to then use Kim's events to define causation. Answer: treat causation as the primitive.
Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
     Full Idea: The criticism most frequently levelled against Kim's theory is that it results in an unacceptable plurality of finely differentiated events, because of the requirement for identity of the constituent property.
     From: comment on Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 4.4
     A reaction: This may mean that the Battle of Waterloo was several trillion events, which seems daft to the historian, but it doesn't to the physicist. A cannon firing is indeed an accumulation of lots of little events.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d)
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
     Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e)
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
     Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c)
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
     Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e)
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a)
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b)
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
     Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e)
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
     Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a)
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: Epicurus said that body was conceived as an aggregate of shape and size and resistance and weight.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE])
     A reaction: [Source Sextus 'Adversus Mathematicos' 10.257] Note that this is how we 'conceive' them. They might be intrinsically different, except that Epicurus is pretty much a phenomenalist.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
     Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d)
     A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
     A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
     A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
     Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: He who claims that everything occurs by necessity has no complaint against him who claims that everything does not occur by necessity. For he makes the very claim in question by necessity.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 40)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: One should bring this question to bear on all one's desires: what will happen to me if what is sought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if it is not?
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: Yet another example of Epicurus moving up a level in his thinking about ethical issues, as in Idea 14517 and Idea 14519. The mark of a true philosopher. This seems to be a key idea for wisdom - to think further ahead than merely what you desire.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: It is not possible to live pleasantly without living intelligently and finely and justly, nor to live intelligently and finely and justly without living pleasantly.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 5), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16
     A reaction: A person with all these virtues might still suffer from depression. And I don't see why having limited intelligence should stop someone from living pleasantly. Just be warm-hearted.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: There is no such things as justice in itself; in people's relations with one another in any place and at any time it is a contract about not harming or being harmed.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 33), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 13.2
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours' characters thus too, if they are respectable.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: I like this because it introduces a metaethical dimension to the whole problem of virtue. We should value our own character - so should we try to improve it? Should we improve so much as to become unrecognisable?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, neither to harm one another nor to be harmed.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 31)
     A reaction: Notice that justice is not just reciprocal usefulness, but a 'pledge' to that effect. This implies a metaethical value of trust and honesty in keeping the pledge. Is it better to live by the pledge, or to be always spontaneously useful?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 37)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
     Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a)
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible reasons for committing suicide.
     From: Epicurus (Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags) [c.290 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: It is a pity that the insult of 'small-minded' has slipped out of philosophy. The Greeks use it all the time, and know exactly what it means. We all recognise small-mindedness, and it is a great (and subtle) vice.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
     Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 231
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b)
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 233.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d)