91 ideas
| 224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
| 24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every account is either a definition or a demonstration. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a24) | |
| A reaction: That is, it is either a summary of the thing's essential nature, or it is a proof of some natural fact, starting from first principles. |
| 24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One member of a pair of contraries is sufficient to discern both itself and its opposite. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411a02) | |
| A reaction: This obviously requires prior knowledge of what the opposite is. He says you can infer the crooked from the straight. You can hardly use light in isolation to infer dark [see DA 418b17]. What's the opposite of a pig? |
| 232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
| 8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
| From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
| A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
| 13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
| Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
| From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
| 14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
| From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
| 1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Number we perceive by the denial of continuity. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425a19) | |
| A reaction: This is a key thought. A being (call it 'Parmenides') which sees all Being as One would make no distinctions of identity, and so could not count anything. Why would they want numbers? |
| 16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
| A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
| 229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) |
| 21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
| From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
| A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
| 15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Lowe's solution the 'temporary intrinsics' problem is that particles have no temporary intrinsic properties; they may be safely supposed to endure, and large things consist of those enduring particles, undergoing rearrangement but no intrinsic change. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance [1987]) by David Lewis - Rearrangement of Particles II | |
| A reaction: A mere rearrangement of particles doesn't sound the same as a change in properties, which must involve causal powers in some way. |
| 24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order … - for example, the triangle in the quadrilateral, or the nutritive part of animate things in the perceptual part. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 414a28) | |
| A reaction: 'Prior' seems to be a value for Aristotle, which is never present in modern discussions of ontological relations and structure. Priority tracks back to first principles. |
| 221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) |
| 16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the eye were an animal, sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed it is no longer an eye,except in name. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b18) | |
| A reaction: This is a drastic view of form as merely function, which occasionally appears in Aristotle. To say a blind eye is not an eye is a tricky move in metaphysics. So what is it? In some sense it is still an eye. |
| 223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
| 227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
| Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
| 210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
| 220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
| 211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
| 219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
| Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
| 228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
| 16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
| From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
| A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
| 218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
| 215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
| 212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
| 213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
| 216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
| Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
| 217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
| 214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
| 15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
| A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
| 24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The cause of its being for everything is its substance. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b12) | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if 'substance' here means essence. We no longer see the cause of something's being as intrinsic to the thing. Only previous causes produce things. The 'form' must be the intrinsic cause of being. |
| 24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Matter is potentiality, whereas form is actuality. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a09) | |
| A reaction: Plato said mud has no Form. What did Aristotle think of that? I only ask because to me mud looks like unformed actuality. |
| 24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For a dialectician anger is a desire for retaliation or something like that, where for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hoot stuff around the heart. The scientist gives the matter, where the dialectician give the form and the account. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a30) | |
| A reaction: A nice illumination of hylomorphism. Notice that the dialectician also give the account [logos]. |
| 15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
| From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
| A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
| 15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
| Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
| From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
| A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
| 15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
| A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
| 13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
| 15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
| 5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The intellect is in a way potentially the object of thought, but nothing in actuality before it thinks, and the potentiality is like that of the tablet on which there is nothing actually written. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 429b31) | |
| A reaction: This passage is referred to by Leibniz, and is the origin of the concept of the 'tabula rasa'. Aristotle need not be denying innate ideas, but merely describing the phenomenology of the moment before a train of thought begins. |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428b19) | |
| A reaction: This is, surprisingly, the view which was raised and largely rejected in 'Theaetetus'. It became a doctrine of Epicureanism, and seems to make Aristotle a thoroughgoing empiricist, though that is not so clear elsewhere. I think Aristotle is right. |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413b23) |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A possible line of inquiry would be into the question for what purpose we have many senses and not just one. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425b04) |
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle famously holds that in perception our minds take on the form of what is being perceived. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |
| A reaction: [References in Aristotle needed here...] |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Why is there not also a sense of the senses themselves? And why don't the senses produce sensation without external bodies, since they contain elements? | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417a03) |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ. To suppose that it is requires the supposition that on contact with the object the sense-organ itself discerns what is doing the discerning. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 426b16) |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not special to any one sense, but common to all. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a18) |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now I call that sense-object 'special' that does not admit of being perceived by another sense and about which it is impossible to be deceived. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a15) |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In the thinking soul, images play the part of percepts, and the assertion or negation of good or bad is invariably accompanied by avoidance or pursuit, which is the reason for the soul's never thinking without an image. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a15) |
| 1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Perception is of particular things, but knowledge is of universals, which are in a way in the soul itself. Thus a man may think whenever he wishes, but not perceive. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417b22) |
| 16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In demonstration a definition of the essence is required as starting point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously be dialectical and futile. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b25) | |
| A reaction: Interesting to see 'dialectical' used as a term of abuse! Illuminating. For scientific essentialism, then, demonstration is filling out the whole story once the essence has been inferred. It is circular, because essence is inferred from accidents. |
| 24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Demonstrations are both from a starting-point and have a sort of end, namely the deduction or the conclusion. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a25) | |
| A reaction: A starting point has to be a first principle [arché]. It has been observed that Aristotle explains demonstration very carefully, but rarely does it in his writings. |
| 16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 402b18) | |
| A reaction: Although Aristotle was cautious about this, he clearly endorses here the idea that essences play an explanatory role in geometry. The caution is in the word 'useful', rather than 'vital'. How else can we arrive at this result, though? |
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul seems to be universally defined by three features, so to speak, the production of movement, perception and incorporeality. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 405b12) | |
| A reaction: 'Incorporeality' begs the question, but its appearance is a phenomenon that needs explaining. 'Movement' is an interesting Greek view. Nowadays we would presumably added intentional states, and the contents and meaning of thoughts. No 'reason'? |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
| Full Idea: On the later views inspired by Aristotle's 'De Anima' there was no longer just one soul, but several, and each of them had a great deal in common with the body. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.17 | |
| A reaction: Is this based on the faculties of sophia, episteme, nous, techne and phronesis, or is it based on the vegetative, appetitive and rational parts? The latter, I presume. Not so interesting, not so modular. |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Three ways have been handed down in which people define the soul: what is most capable of moving things, since it moves itself; or a body which is the most fine-grained and least corporeal; or that it is composed of the elements. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 409b19) | |
| A reaction: A nice example of Aristotle beginning an investigation by idenfying the main explanations which have been 'handed down' from previous generations. These three aren't really in competition, and might all be true. |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Soul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412a20) | |
| A reaction: To understand what Aristotle means by 'form' you must, I'm afraid, read the 'Metaphysics'. Form isn't shape, but rather the essence which bestows the individual identity on the thing. 'Psuche is the essence of man' might be a better slogan. |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul is the cause [aitia] of its body alike in three senses which we explicitly recognise. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, and it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 415b09) | |
| A reaction: 'Aitia' also means explanation, so these are three ways to explain a human being, by what it does, why what it is for, and by what it intrinsically is. Activity, purpose and nature. |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: How could a spatial understanding understand anything? Wiil it do so with parts, seen as magnitudes or as points? If it is points, the understanding will never get through them all. If magnitudes, it will understand things an unlimited number of times. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407a09) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a strong commitment to the idea that the mind is not physical because it is necessarily non-spatial. |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the soul is composed of parts of the body, or the harmony of the elements composing the body, there will be many souls, and everywhere in the body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a15) | |
| A reaction: We will ignore "everywhere in the body", but the rest seems to me exactly right. The idea of the unity of the soul is an understandable and convenient assumption, but it leads to all sorts of confusion. A crowd remains unified if half its members leave. |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What is it that holds the soul together, if it by nature has parts? For surely it cannot be the body. For it seems on the contrary that it is rather the soul that holds the body together? | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b05) | |
| A reaction: This is the hylomorphic view of a human, that the soul is the form that give unity to the matter. To do the job, presumably the form or soul need an intrinsic unity of its own, and hence cannot have parts. Apart from the need for unifying glue. |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If soul has parts, what holds them together? Not body, because that is united by soul. If a thing unifies the soul, then THAT is the soul (unless it too has parts, which would lead to an infinite regress). Best to say the soul is a unity. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 411b10) | |
| A reaction: You don't need a 'thing' to unify something (like a crowd). I say the body holds the soul together, not physically, but because the body's value permeates thought. The body is the focused interest of the soul, like parents kept together by their child. |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The soul is in a way all the things that exist, for all the things that exist are objects either of perception or of thought. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431b20) | |
| A reaction: Sounds very like Berkeley's empirical version of idealism. It also seems to imply modern externalist (anti-individualist) understandings of the mind (which strike me as false). |
| 24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For those who divide the soul into parts, and divide and separate them in accord with their capacities, the parts turn out to be very many. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a32) | |
| A reaction: I accept the warning. The capacities which interest me are those which seem to generate our basic ontology, but if the capacities become fine-grained, they are legion. |
| 24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If an animal has a desiring part, it is capable of moving itself. A desiring part, however, cannot exist without an imagination, and all imagination is either rationally calculative or perceptual. Hence in the latter the other animals also have a share. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b27) | |
| A reaction: Maybe if you asked people whether other animals are imaginative they would say no, but this argument is strong support for the positive view. |
| 1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Most affections (like anger) seem to involve the body, but thinking seems distinctive of the soul. But if this requires imagination, it too involves the body. Only pure mental activity would prove the separation of the two. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a08-) | |
| A reaction: What an observant man! Modern neuroscience is bringing out the fact that emotion is central to all mental life. We can't recognise faces without it. I say imagination is essential to pure reason, and that seems emotional too. Reason is physical. |
| 24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The affections of the soul - spiritedness, fear, pity, confidence, joy, loving, hating - would all seem to involve the body, since at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 403a16) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle was not a physicalist, but this resembles the pilot-in-the-ship passage in Descartes, accepting the very close links. |
| 24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That the soul is not separable from the body - or that certain parts of it are not, if it naturally has parts - is quite clear. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413a04) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't make him a physicalist. I've seen him described in modern terms as a functionalist, but that makes the mind abstract and the body concrete. Perhaps he is an 'Integrationist' (as Descartes might be in his 'pilot' passage). |
| 24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the soul is something distinct from the mixture, why then are the being for flesh and for the other parts of the animal destroyed at the same time? | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408a25) | |
| A reaction: An obvious response to this reasonable question is to say that we see the body die, but not the soul, so the soul doesn't die. The problem is then to find some evidence for the soul's continued existence. |
| 24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is another absurdity which follows, …since they attach the soul to a body, and place it in the body, without further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about. …Yet this seems necessary, because this association produces action. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b14) | |
| A reaction: A clear statement of the interaction objection to full substance dualism. Critics say that dualists have to invoke a 'miracle' at this point. |
| 1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Early thinkers try only to describe the soul, but they fail to go into any kind of detail about the body which is to receive the soul, as if it were possible (as it is in the Pythagorean tales) for just any old soul to be clothed in just any old body. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 407b20) | |
| A reaction: Precisely. Anyone who seriously believes that a human mind can be reincarnated in a flea needs their mind examined. Actually they need their brain examined, but that probably wouldn't impress them. I can, of course, imagine moving into a flea. |
| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33 | |
| A reaction: A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions. |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps it would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does in virtue of the soul. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408b12) | |
| A reaction: This can be seen as incipient behaviourism in Aristotle's view. It echoes the functionalist view that what matters is not what the mind is, or is made of, but what it does. |
| 13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We should not enquire whether the soul and the body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b06) | |
| A reaction: This is his hylomorphist view of objects, so that the soul is the 'form' which bestows identity (and power) on the matter of which it is made. This remark is thoroughly physicalist. |
| 1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Thinking, then, is something other than perceiving, and its two kinds are held to be imagination and supposition. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 427b28) |
| 23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle insists [against Plato] that desires, even rational desires, are a capacity distinct from reason, as is perception. Belief is included within reason. And he sometimes distinguishes steps of reasoning from insight. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428-432) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Shifting' | |
| A reaction: So the standard picture of desire as permanently in conflict with reason comes from Aristotle. Maybe Plato is right on that one (though he doesn't say much about it). Since objectivity needs knowledge, reason does need belief. |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Self-controlled people, even when they desire and have an appetite for things, do not do these things for which they have the desire, but instead follow the understanding. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a06) | |
| A reaction: If modern discussions would stop talking of 'weakness of will', and talk instead of 'control' and its lack, the whole issue would become clearer. Akrasia is then seen, for example, as an action of the whole person, not of some defective part. |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |
| A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
| 222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
| 1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nature does nothing in vain. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a31) |
| 225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
| 233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
| 2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
| 231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
| 1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every movement being either a push or a pull, there must be a still point as with the circle, and this will be the point of departure for the movement. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433b26) |
| 24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There a four sorts of movement - spatial movement, alteration, withering and growth. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a12) | |
| A reaction: Large parts of Aristotle's writings attempt to explain these four. |
| 1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be two producers of movement, either desire or practical intellect, but practical reason begins in desire. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 433a16) |
| 24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not necessary for what moves things to be itself moving. For a thing can be moving in two ways - with reference to something else, or intrinsically. A ship is moving intrinsically, but sailors move because they are in something that is moving. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 406a03) | |
| A reaction: I love the way that Aristotle is desperate to explain the puzzle of movement, yet we just take it for granted. Very illuminating about puzzles. Newton's First Law of Motion. |
| 24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What has pushed something else makes the latter push as well. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 435b30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle seems to have spotted that this is intrinsic to massive bodies, and is not just friction etc. Newton adds a vector to Aristotle's insight. |
| 24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What has been born must have growth, a prime of life, and a time of withering away. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 434a23) | |
| A reaction: Modern biologists don't seem much interested in the 'prime of life', but for Aristotle it is crucial, as the fulfilment of a thing's essential nature. Nietzsche would probably agree with Aristotle on this. We dread seeing one period of life as 'superior'. |
| 234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |