Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Method and Results' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
     From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
     A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
     Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
     Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
     A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
     Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
     From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
     A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey]
     Full Idea: T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism.
     From: report of T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1
     A reaction: This is, of course, impossible, because there can't be a clear statement of epiphenomenalism.
Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley]
     Full Idea: All states of consciousness are caused by molecular changes of brain substance. It seems to me there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism.
     From: T.H. Huxley (Method and Results [1893], p.244), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 3.1.1
     A reaction: This sounds odd. Most people would say there is nothing more obvious than mental events causing actions. It certainly seems undeniable that actions are cause by the contents of thoughts, so a molecular account of intentional states is needed.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').