Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Explanation in Mathematics' and 'On Fate ('De fato')'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)
     A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
     Full Idea: Essences and essential properties do not seem to be useful in mathematical contexts, since all mathematical truths are regarded as necessary (though Kit Fine distinguishes between essential and necessary properties).
     From: Paolo Mancosu (Explanation in Mathematics [2008], §6.1)
     A reaction: I take the proviso in brackets to be crucial. This represents a distortion of notion of an essence. There is a world of difference between the central facts about the nature of a square and the peripheral inferences derivable from it.
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero]
     Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03)
     A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero]
     Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40)
     A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').