Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)' and 'Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis''

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention

12394	If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
	Full Idea: A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.64)
	A reaction: This is clearly in tune with Quine's assertion that logic is potentially revisable, and the idea is pragmatist in spirit. It is hard to deny that intuitions about what makes a good argument control our logic. I say the world controls our intuitions.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox

21554	Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
	Full Idea: Cantor proved that the number of sets in a collection of terms is larger than the number of terms. Hence Cantor's Paradox says the number of sets in the collection of all sets must be larger than the number of sets in the collection of all sets.
	From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
	A reaction: The sets must count as terms in the next iteration, but that is a normal application of the Power Set axiom.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox

21553	It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
	Full Idea: The ordinal series is well-ordered and thus has an ordinal number, and a series of ordinals to a given ordinal exceeds that ordinal by 1. So the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number that exceeds its own ordinal number by 1.
	From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
	A reaction: Formulated by Burali-Forti in 1897.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

14292	Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Dispositions of a thing are as important to us as overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. So we are moved to enquire whether we can bring them down to earth, and explain disposition terms without reference to occult powers.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], II.3)
	A reaction: Mumford quotes this at the start of his book on dispositions, as his agenda. I suspect that the 'occult' aspect crept in because dispositions were based on powers, and the dominant view was that these were the immediate work of God.

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem

18749	Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
	Full Idea: Goodman constructed arguments that purported to show that a satisfactory syntactic analysis of the confirmation relation can never be found. In response, philosophers of science tried to model it in probabilistic terms.
	From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 4
	A reaction: I take this idea to say that Bayesianism was developed in response to the grue problem. This is an interesting light on 'grue', which never bothered me much. The point is it scuppered formal attempts to model induction.

17646	Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
	Full Idea: Goodman has shown that no purely formal criterion can distinguish arguments that are intuitively sound inductive arguments for unsound ones: for every sound one there is an unsound one of the same form. The predicates in the argument make the difference.
	From: report of Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954]) by Hilary Putnam - Why there isn't a ready-made world 'Causation'
	A reaction: This is to swallow grue whole. I think a bit more chewing is called for. By this date Putnam strikes me as a crazy relativist who has lost his grip on the world. Note the word 'formal' - but Putnam seems to think the argument is important.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

4794	We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Rather than a sentence being used for prediction because it is a law, it is called a law because it is used for prediction.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], p.21), quoted by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §5.4
	A reaction: This smacks of dodgy pragmatism, and sounds deeply wrong. The perception of a law has to be prior to making the prediction. Why do we make the prediction, if we haven't spotted a law. Goodman is mesmerised by language instead of reality.