Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'I.39 On Solitude' and 'Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?'

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5 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
     Full Idea: A 'myth' or fiction for me is a true internal statement (a statement endorsed by the rules) whose external truth value is as may be, the point being that that truth value is from an internal standpoint quite irrelevant.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], IX)
     A reaction: This contrasts with Carnap, for whom talk of 'ghosts' is false in an internal thing-framework. Yablo seems here to say a statement can be true while having no truth value. Presumably he is relaxing the internal rules.
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
     Full Idea: Make-believe games can make it easier to reason about facts, to systematize them, to visualize them, to spot connections with other facts, and to evaluate potential lines of research.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XI)
     A reaction: This is the key pragmatic defence of the fictionalist view of abstract objects. Fictions are devices to help us think better. I think a lot of ontology turns out that way.
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
     Full Idea: It is an open question whether the clouds that we call 'angry' are literally F, for any F other than 'such that it would be natural and proper to regard them as angry if one were going to attribute emotions to clouds'.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? [1998], XII)
     A reaction: His point is that it is TRUE, in those circumstances, that the clouds are angry. Thus fictions are a valid and useful part of ordinary sensible course, giving real information. I like it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We must fight fiercely to hang on to the few pleasures which survive into old age [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: I am training and sharpening my appetite for those pleasures that are left. ...We must cling tooth and claw to the use of the pleasures of this life which the advancing years, one after another, rip from our grasp.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (I.39 On Solitude [1580], p.276)
     A reaction: That may be one of the most inspiring ideas I have read about pleasure.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').