Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Cruelty' and 'The Sublime and the Good'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik]
     Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne.
     From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1
     A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?).
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works of art which we know to be such independently. …So let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists, and let our aesthetic be the philosophical justification of this judgement.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.205)
     A reaction: She offers this view in specific contradiction of Tolstoy, which says we should first have a theory, and then judge accordingly. I take Murdoch to be entirely right, but it means that our aesthetic theory will shift over time.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: The work of the great artists shows up 'art-for-art's-sake' as a flimsy frivolous doctrine.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218)
     A reaction: She keeps referring to tragedy (as the greatest art), but it is hard to see how we learn love and morality from a great pot or a great abstract painting. Wilde makes the doctrine frivolous, but I think it contains a degree of truth. Music.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218)
     A reaction: Is an enhancement of one's love necessarily a moral improvement? Love is a fine feeling, but how does it motivate? Has no wickedness ever been perpetrated in the name of love? 'All's fair in love and war'.
Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Art and morals are (with certain provisos) one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215)
     A reaction: The idea that art, morals and love are all just a single thing seems unhelpful. What about satire? What about duty without love? What about pure abstract painting? What about Stravinsky's highly formal view of his music?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is a necessary condition for love, but not the thing itself. The realisation she describes may not be love. You would attain her realisation if you shared a prison cell with a terrifying psychopath.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').