Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'There is no a Priori' and 'Introduction to Philosophical Papers II'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience

16210	Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Humean supervenience says the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact. We have a geometry of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points, and local qualities at points. …In short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
	From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986], p.ix-x)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is the key fundamental tenet of David Lewis's philosophy. He names it after Hume because it contains no necessary connections. It is 'supervenient' because all worldly truths reduce to and depend on the mosaic. His thesis is contingent.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

9354	Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Why should we accept that necessities can only be known a priori? Prima facie, some necessities are known empirically; for example, that water is necessarily H2O, and that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus.
	From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
	A reaction: An important question, whatever your view. If the only thing we can know a priori is necessities, it doesn't follow that necessities can only be known a priori. It gets interesting if we say that some necessities can never be known a priori.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts

9353	We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
	Full Idea: We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way.
	From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
	A reaction: I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori

9356	The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
	Full Idea: The whole idea of the a priori is too obscure for it to feature in a good explanation of our knowledge of anything.
	From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §3)
	A reaction: I never like this style of argument. It would be nice if all the components of all our our explanations were crystal clear. Total clarity about anything is probably a hopeless dream, and we may have to settle for murky corners in all explanations.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature

9426	The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another.
	From: David Lewis (Introduction to Philosophical Papers II [1986])
	A reaction: Basing laws on this picture is what Lewis calls 'Humean Supervenience'.