Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art'' and 'The Mind and the Soul'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
9295 Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
9293 Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20327 Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: In modern discussions, rather than look for intrinsic properties of objects, including aesthetic or formal properties, attention has turned to extrinsic or relational properties, notably of a social, historical, or 'institutional' nature.
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
     A reaction: Lots of modern branches of philosophy have made this move, which seems to me like a defeat. We want to know why things have the relations they do. Just mapping the relations is superficial Humeanism.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
20326 Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: In the early twentieth century there were numerous attempts at defining the essence art. Significant form, intuition, the expression of emotion, organic unity, and other notions, were offered to this end.
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1)
     A reaction: As far as I can see the whole of aesthetics was demolished in one blow by Marcel Duchamp's urinal. Artists announce: we will tell you what art is; you should just sit and listen. Compare the invention of an anarchic sport.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
20330 The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson]
     Full Idea: The dualistic view of the arts holds that works of art come in two fundamentally different kinds: those that are abstract entities, i.e. types, and those that are physical objects (tokens).
     From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 2)
     A reaction: Paintings are the main reason for retaining physical objects. Strawson 1974 argues that paintings are only physical because we cannot yet perfectly reproduce them. I agree. Works of art are types, not tokens.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
9292 The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1)
     A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture.
9294 No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition.