Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Quine on Quantifying In' and 'Bayesianism'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Do we attribute a logical form to a sentence token because it is a token of a type with that form, or do we attribute a logical form to a sentence type because it is a type of a token with that form?
     From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.110)
     A reaction: Since I believe in propositions (as the unambiguous thought that lies behind a sentence), I take it that logical form concerns propositions, though strict logicians don't like this, for fear that logic spills into psychology.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Substitutional quantification may be regarded as referential quantification over expressions.
     From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.124)
     A reaction: This is an illuminating gloss. Does such quantification involve some ontological commitment to expressions? I feel an infinite regress looming.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').