Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Toward a Philosophy of History' and 'Summa quaestionum super Sententias'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)

20752	For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
	Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be.
	From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem'
	A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

16659	Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi]
	Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16673	Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi]
	Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
	A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

20756	Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
	Full Idea: Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man.
	From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.217), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Situated'
	A reaction: Makes explicit the existentialist denial of human nature. The foundation of ethics can only be total freedom, to choose both yourself and your actions. What is inescapable is the social and culture contexts. What is the role of the 'history'?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

16663	Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi]
	Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being.
	From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
	A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example.