8 ideas
12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
Full Idea: This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas. | |
From: John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries. |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt. |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
Full Idea: There are deep problems for utilitarianism in trying to work out what the ideal population size would be. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Four) |