Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Identity' and 'A Realist Theory of Science'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Kind essences are the categorical bases of a thing's causal powers [Bhaskar, by Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Bhaskar identifies kind essences with underlying properties, often called 'categorical bases', of the causal powers of things.
     From: report of Roy Bhaskar (A Realist Theory of Science [1975], p.212) by Anjan Chakravarrty - Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences 1
     A reaction: The problem with this, it always seems to me, is the something inherently passive is said to give rise to something which is inherently active. Couldn't two individuals with a kind have slightly different categorical bases?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Our conceptual grip on the notion of a set is founded on the axiom of extensionality: a set x is the same as a set y iff x and y have the same members. But this axiom deploys the notion of absolute identity ('same members').
     From: John Hawthorne (Identity [2003], 3.1)
     A reaction: Identity seems to be a primitive, useful and crucial concept, so don't ask what it is. I suspect that numbers can't get off the ground without it (especially, in view of the above, if you define numbers in terms of sets).
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').