Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Actions' and 'Action, Intention and Reason'

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3 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying
Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
     Full Idea: Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
     From: report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
     A reaction: [compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason.
     From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien'
     A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').