Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Letters to Leibniz' and 'Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation)'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation) [1938], §259), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Contributions'
     A reaction: Polt describes this remark as 'theatrical', but it seems to speak for itself!
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').